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American ambivalence toward international institutions is nothing new. In 
his farewell address, George Washington famously warned against foreign en-
tanglements.1 After World War I, the U.S. Senate rejected the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, leaving the United States outside the formal post-war order it helped es-
tablish and neutering the new League of Nations.2 Throughout the late 
twentieth century, the United States refused to ratify multilateral agreements 
ranging from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,3 to the UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea,4 to a host of human rights agreements.5 Nor did 
the dawn of the twenty-first century change the United States’ attitude. In 2001, 
President George W. Bush began his administration by “unsigning” the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol on the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.6 These agreements run the gamut 
from treaties on peace and security to the environment, and from human rights 
to the law of the sea. 
But one area—international trade—has fared better than others in insulat-
ing itself from the United States’ hesitation toward international institutions. 
Even while he warned against foreign entanglements, Washington also coun-
seled his successors to “establish[,] with powers so disposed, . . . conventional 
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 1. President George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in AM. DAILY ADVERTISER [here-
inafter Washington Farewell Address], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. 
 2. The Treaty of Versailles, U.S. SENATE (last visited Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.senate.gov/artand 
history/history/common/generic/Feature_Homepage_TreatyVersailles.htm. 
 3. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (last visited Mar. 9, 2019), 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm. 
 4. Roncevert Ganan Almond, U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, DIPLOMAT (May 24, 
2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/u-s-ratification-of-the-law-of-the-sea-convention/.  
 5. Sophie McBain, Why Is the U.S. So Reluctant to Sign Human Rights Treaties?, NEW STATESMAN 
AM. (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.newstatesman.com/north-america/2013/10/why-us-so-reluctant-sign-human-
rights-treaties (noting that the U.S. has failed to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, The Convention against Enforced Dis-
appearance, the Mine Ban Treaty, and a number of other international human rights treaties). 
 6. Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2061–64 (2003). 
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rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will 
permit . . . .”7 
This embrace of commerce and the international institutions that support 
it has been relatively consistent throughout American history. Even in the face 
of significant domestic political resistance to new trade agreements, such as 
opposition to NAFTA in the early 1990s and the Seattle riots at the WTO Min-
isterial in 1998, key government institutions have by and large supported inter-
national trade institutions, even when they have been leery of other institu-
tions.8  
No longer. The 2016 presidential election sent Donald Trump to the 
White House on a platform of renegotiating trade agreements that he argued 
had poorly served American interests, especially those of the blue-collar work-
ers so central to politics in the states that delivered the presidency to Trump. 
Since taking office, the Trump administration has embarked on an aggressive 
campaign to use trade policy to rebuild American manufacturing capacity. It 
has imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports in an effort to expand pro-
ductive capacity and jobs in those sectors.9 It has renegotiated NAFTA to in-
clude provisions it hopes will return more of the automotive supply chain to the 
United States.10 And it has taken on China over its industrial policy that has led 
to the loss of U.S. jobs.11 
These actions, unfortunately, have done little so far to meaningfully ad-
dress the very real underlying concern.12 Neither U.S. trade policy nor interna-
tional trade agreements do enough to ensure that trade liberalization supports 
important social values, such as an equitable distribution of wealth and envi-
ronmental protection, which market transactions often undervalue. Given the 
 
 7. Washington Farewell Address, supra note 1. 
 8. The line is, of course, not unbroken. Congress resisted the GATT’s formation and development, as 
well as the establishment of an international organization to oversee the GATT, in the mid-twentieth century. 
Critically, though, this congressional opposition was never strong enough to overcome presidential enthusiasm 
for the multilateral trading system. See Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of 
Powers, 107 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 21–22). 
 9. David J. Lynch & Damian Paletta, Trump Announces Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Thursday over 
Objections from Advisers and Republicans, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/business/wp/2018/03/01/white-house-planning-major-announcement-thursday-on-steel-and-aluminum-
imports/?utm_term=.609371fb7aeb.   
 10. Jen Kirby, USMCA, Trump’s New NAFTA Deal, Explained in 500 Words, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019, 10:17 
PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/3/17930092/usmca-nafta-trump-trade-deal-explained (noting that automo-
biles must have at least 75% of their components manufactured in the U.S., Mexico, or Canada to be tariff-free 
and that by 2023, 40 to 45% of automobile parts must be manufactured by workers who earn at least $16 per 
hour). 
 11. See David H. Autor et al., The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large 
Changes in Trade 28–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21906, 2016), https://www. 
nber.org/papers/w21906; Jim Tankersley & Keith Bradsher, Trump Hits China with Tariffs on $200 Billion in 
Goods, Escalating Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/us/ 
politics/trump-china-tariffs-trade.html. 
       12.  Indeed, the Trump administration’s policies have expanded the number of communities left out of 
the rising tide of globalization. While the overall economy and stock market have generally continued to thrive 
during the Trump administration, the U.S. agricultural sector has suffered enormously as other countries have 
retaliated against the United States for the Trump’s administration’s trade policies. 
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Trump administration’s failure to make good on the demand for a socially in-
clusive trade policy, it falls to others to find a way forward. Into that void steps 
Professor Gregory Shaffer with his innovative and illuminating article, Retool-
ing Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion.13 Professor Shaffer’s article is what 
scholarship should be—well versed in theory and of immediate practical signif-
icance.  
Professor Shaffer’s article is a rich work on the relationship between the 
international trading system and issues of broader social policy. In this essay, I 
want to build upon two points Professor Shaffer makes. In Part I, I discuss the 
history of U.S. trade policy and how the separation of trade policy into what 
Professor Shaffer calls a “two-step model”—the first, a foreign policy issue 
aimed at maximizing the benefits of liberalized trade, and the second, a domes-
tic policy issue aimed at combatting distributional problems resulting there-
from—has proven unsustainable because domestic politicians have failed to 
address the social inequalities caused by free trade. Part II responds to critics 
who argue that the crisis he identifies does not exist. In Part III, I discuss the 
substantial promise, but also peril, of a key component of Professor Shaffer’s 
proposed solution to this crisis: revising trade remedies laws to permit countries 
to impose social dumping duties.  
I. THE CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
An Absence of Social Inclusion 
Over the course of U.S. history, trade policy has served a number of dif-
ferent purposes. In the first years of the Republic, trade policy was a critical 
component of foreign policy as the United States attempted to remain neutral in 
the Napoleonic wars engulfing Europe.14 In the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, Henry Clay’s “American System” used tariffs—the primary tool of trade 
policy until at least the mid-twentieth century—to raise revenue for westward 
expansion, while also protecting infant industries located predominantly in the 
northeast.15 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, tariff proponents justi-
fied their policy preferences on the grounds of industrial development and labor 
protection.16 In the aftermath of World War II and during the Cold War, for-
eign policy once again played a predominant role in shaping U.S. trade poli-
 
 13. See generally Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion, 2019 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1 (2019).  
 14. President George Washington, The Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/neutra93.asp. 
 15. See DOUGLAS IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY 157–58 (2017) 
(explaining how the Senate used internal improvements to incentivize tariff votes). See also FRANK WILLIAM 
TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 23 (7th ed. 1923) (describing “protection to young 
industries”). 
 16. See James L. Huston, A Political Response to Industrialism: The Republican Embrace of Protection-
ist Labor Doctrines, 70 J. AM. HIST. 35, 36 (1983). 
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cy.17 The United States supported multilateral trade liberalization through the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), the forerunner of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), as a means of rebuilding American allies 
and providing a bulwark against communist expansion.18 
With the end of the Cold War, however, U.S. trade policy lost its moor-
ings. Foreign policy continued to provide a justification for granting for certain 
trade agreements with American allies, such as agreements with countries like 
Australia that backed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.19 But these agreements 
were too small to have a meaningful economy-wide effect on the United States 
and were often simple quid pro quo agreements that did not pursue any grand 
foreign policy vision. The Obama administration tried to justify its mega-
regional trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”), on the 
grounds that it would allow the United States to “write the rules of the road” 
against a rising China.20 To many commentators, however, that justification did 
not seem to match the substance of the TPP, which looked very similar to boil-
erplate U.S. trade agreements.21 Nor did this rationale persuade the U.S. public, 
which in 2016 endorsed presidential candidates from both major parties that 
disavowed the TPP. The ultimate winner of the election, President Donald 
Trump, pulled the United States out of the pact.22   
In retrospect, the need to rely on flimsy foreign policy justifications fore-
told the collapse of what Professor Shaffer has called the “two-step model.”23 
The two-step model starts where the foreign policy paradigm of U.S. trade pol-
icy leaves off, treating international trade policy as primarily an international 
policy problem rather than a domestic economic one. Economists and commen-
 
 17. See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 25–26 (arguing that trade policy was justified primarily on 
foreign policy grounds during the Cold War).  
 18. President Eisenhower called on Congress to support creation of an Organization for Trade Coopera-
tion (OTC) to administer the GATT in 1955, saying that the failure to do so would “play directly into the hands 
of the Communists.” IRWIN, supra note 14, at 516. In his 1955 State of the Union address, President Eisenhow-
er declared that “[w]e must expand international trade and investment and assist friendly nations whose own 
best efforts are still insufficient to provide the strength essential to the security of the free world.” Id. at 519. 
His successor, President Kennedy, called trade agreements “an important new weapon to advance the cause of 
freedom” against the communists. Id. at 527.  
 19. United States and Australia Sign Free Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (May 18, 2004), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/archives/2004/may/united-states-and-australia-sign-free-trade-a. 
 20. See, e.g., Barack Obama, The TPP Would Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade, 
WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-
america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-
50921721165d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4340d1028fa7 (“As a Pacific power, the United States 
has pushed to develop a high-standard Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal that puts American workers first 
and makes sure we write the rules of the road for trade in the 21st century.”). 
 21. See Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 315, 316–17 (2018) 
(noting that U.S. trade agreements, including TPP, are largely boilerplate). 
 22. Trump Executive Order Pulls Out of TPP Trade Deal, BBC (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-us-canada-38721056. 
 23. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 2–3.  
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tators of different stripes subscribed to this view.24 They agreed that reducing 
trade barriers creates wealth, and that such wealth creation was a normatively 
desirable goal. On this view, the pesky question of who would possess this 
wealth was not a proper question for international economic policy. That ques-
tion, rather, was one for domestic economic policy.25  
As a political matter, this two-step process allowed policymakers that dis-
agreed on economic policy writ-large to agree on international trade policy.26 
Distributional questions are, after all, the most contentious part of any econom-
ic policy. By simply removing distributional questions from international trade 
policy, policymakers on both sides of the political aisle could agree to support a 
program of trade liberalization that would increase the aggregate wealth of the 
United States.  
As Professor Shaffer rightly notes, the two-step model also allowed the 
government to yield to pressure from capital.27 A combination of technology 
improvements, prior international trade liberalization, and the absence of inter-
national tax harmonization allowed corporations to move or threaten to move 
jobs and productive resources like capital itself to countries with more favora-
ble economic policies. Corporations used this leverage to push governments to 
negotiate international agreements that were increasingly favorable to capital, 
at the expense of a host of other social concerns. These concerns include labor 
protection (both in terms of overall employment as well as the kinds of jobs 
available), environmental protection, and government revenues that pay for ed-
ucational opportunities, infrastructure, and a social safety net for displaced 
workers.28  
In principle, this two-step model need not have been problematic. Many 
commentators argued that, while liberalizing trade might cause some economic 
hardship for certain individuals, the overall economic growth created would ul-
timately lead to better opportunities for those same individuals. And if, for 
some reason, the invisible hand of the market did not take care of those who 
lost out from trade liberalization, the government could step in to provide assis-
tance.  
As we now know, this theory of “trickle down trade liberalization” did not 
bear fruit. The liberalized international trading system persistently punished 
certain individuals and communities,29 and the government never stepped in 
with assistance adequate to the challenge.30 Instead, domestic economic poli-
cies in many developed countries, including the United States, failed to deal 
with economic inequality. In response, voters in developed countries world-
 
 24. See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
985, 993–34 (2017) [hereinafter Saving the Political Consensus]. 
 25. See id. at 996–97.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 3.  
 28. Id.; Frank J. Garcia & Timothy Meyer, Restoring Trade’s Social Contract, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
ONLINE 78, 81–82 (2017). 
 29. See Autor et al., supra note 11, at 33. 
 30. Garcia & Meyer, supra note 28, at 8. 
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wide began to take international trade liberalization and the institutions that 
support it hostage: negotiate trade agreements that create a more equitable, sus-
tainable international economic system or we will vote to tear the entire house 
down. The Trump trade wars and Britain’s hurtle toward an immediate and 
likely highly damaging exit from the European Union are the most visible ex-
amples of this crisis, but the strength of far-right parties across Europe testify to 
the breadth of the sentiment. Professor Shaffer is thus quite right that now is the 
time for solutions. 
II. A RESPONSE TO THE SKEPTICS 
Before turning to Professor Shaffer’s solutions, I first want to pause to re-
spond to those that believe that the crisis Professor Shaffer and others identify 
is no crisis at all.31 This skeptical view rests on two basic arguments. First, 
technological innovation, not trade, is the primary cause of economic inequali-
ty. Second, the anti-trade elections in recent years are an historical blip that will 
pass as voters’ views of trade liberalization become more favorable again. Both 
of these views are, in my opinion, mistaken. 
Technology and Trade, not Technology or Trade 
For many years, the conventional wisdom has been that technological in-
novation is primarily responsible for economic inequality and dislocation.32 But 
as Professor Shaffer notes, new empirical evidence suggests that the conven-
tional wisdom has understated trade liberalization’s role.33 American manufac-
turing has declined by more than has been previously understood, owing in 
large degree to China’s accession to the WTO.34 Equally importantly, the con-
ventional wisdom imagines trade and technology as distinct spheres. In reality, 
however, they are “intricately linked.”35 Both technological innovation and 
trade allow companies to produce goods at lower cost. In this sense, trade and 
technology are substitutes. As some companies lower their production costs (or 
increase their efficiency) through technological innovation, other companies 
may lobby for trade liberalization as a strategy to remain competitive. The re-
verse is also true—trade liberalization may spur companies to invest in techno-
logical innovation that leads to automation and the loss of jobs. Competitive 
pressures created by one strategy—technological innovation or trade—can spur 
greater use of the other strategy.  
 
 31. See Shaffer, supra note 13, at 10–11 (citing authors that believe the two-step model remains viable).  
 32. Id. at 14.  
 33. Id.; see generally Autor et al., supra note 11.  
 34. See Gwynn Guilford, The Epic Mistake About Manufacturing That’s Cost Americans Millions of 
Jobs, QUARTZ (May 3, 2018), https://qz.com/1269172/the-epic-mistake-about-manufacturing-thats-cost-
americans-millions-of-jobs/. 
 35. Shaffer, supra note 12, at 14. 
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Trade and technology are also complements. As Shaffer notes, the unbun-
dling of supply chains depends on both technology and trade.36 Both make 
global value chains, in which components of a finished product are produced 
and assembled in a variety of different countries, a cheaper method of produc-
ing complex products. Technology reduces costs not only through efficiency 
gains and automation, but also by reducing transportation costs and allowing 
final products to be assembled from intermediate goods produced in different 
places by different actors. Trade liberalization reduces the costs associated with 
global supply chains by eliminating tariffs—just taxes—and other barriers to 
moving intermediate goods (or any goods) around the globe.  
And that is only talking about trade in goods. Services, however, dwarf 
goods in terms of their importance to the modern U.S. economy.37 As the twen-
ty-first century moves on, the combination of trade and technology is likely to 
put the same pressure on services jobs as it did on manufacturing jobs in the 
twentieth century.38 The explosion of overseas call centers and informational 
technology service centers are, in this sense, the canary in the coalmine. They 
foretell of a potential disruption to the U.S. economy of at least the magnitude 
of that which has already occurred.  
As an argument against rethinking how we pursue trade liberalization, the 
trade versus technology dichotomy is mistaken for another reason. Apart from 
the empirical claim that technology is more important than trade, commentators 
have sometimes objected that precisely because trade liberalization and techno-
logical innovation are substitutes in certain respects, one should feel the same 
way about both phenomena.39 The implicit suggestion is that no one except 
Luddites opposes technological innovation, and therefore no one except a Lud-
dite should oppose trade liberalization.  
If this comparison between trade and technology is right, though, it is an 
argument for expanding the regulation of trade. After all, governments do, in 
fact, tightly restrict innovation and trade in certain technologies for a wide vari-
ety of non-economic reasons. Weapons technology may be restricted for na-
tional security reasons; nuclear energy is highly regulated for environmental 
and security reasons; governments may restrict human cloning for moral and 
religious reasons; and so on. Moreover, the equivalence between trade and 
technology, in terms of their social effects, may be overstated. Trade liberaliza-
tion, for instance, may repeatedly hurt the same groups over time, while tech-
nological innovation hurts different groups at different times. Technological 
innovation may also more reliably produce gains that offset its costs, while the 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Kimberly Amadeo, How Does the U.S. Economy Work?, BALANCE (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.thebalance.com/us-economy-4073968 (noting that 50% of US GDP comes from services, while 
only 20% comes from goods).  
 38. RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW 
GLOBALIZATION 149–50 (2016).   
 39. JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 13 (3d ed. 2016) (“The point . . . [is] to 
persuade you that whatever you like or dislike about liberalized trade, you should like or dislike about techno-
logical change.”).  
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ratio of costs to benefits from trade liberalization rise with increased liberaliza-
tion.40  
 
The Roots of the Political Demand for a Socially Inclusive Trade Policy 
 
If the argument about trade versus technology misunderstands the rela-
tionship between the two, the argument about the long-term popularity of trade 
liberalization policies misunderstands the relationship between voters’ policy 
preferences and the political systems that translate those preferences into poli-
cy. Scott Lincicome, for instance, has recently argued that “[c]ontrary to con-
ventional wisdom, the United States is not experiencing a ‘protectionist mo-
ment.’”41 Citing polling data that shows support for trade liberalization, 
Lincicome argues that “[m]ost Americans generally support freer trade, global-
ization, and even oft-maligned trade agreements.”42 As the title of his piece, 
The “Protectionist Moment” That Wasn’t, suggests, Lincicome therefore infers 
that the current disruption in trade liberalization is not a result of a demand for 
policy change from the electorate.  
This polling data, however, tells us little about how electoral politics will 
influence U.S. trade policy. Voters do not cast votes directly over policy issues. 
They vote for candidates who represent a number of different policy positions. 
Consequently, voters who feel intensely about a particular issue are more likely 
to influence policy than voters who don’t feel strongly, even if the latter ex-
press a view when asked.43 As Lincicome acknowledges, most voters do not 
care much about trade policy, and their views are sensitive to how questions are 
framed.44 Such weakly held pro-trade liberalization views are unlikely to influ-
ence policy. Moreover, studies find that voters tend to view economic shocks 
from trade liberalization as different and more serious than other kinds of eco-
nomic shocks.45 Given this disparate stake in policy outcomes, the backlash 
against trade liberalization is not surprising and is likely to last longer than the 
critics suggest it will.   
 
 40. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 13–14.  
 41. Scott Lincicome, The “Protectionist Moment” That Wasn’t: American Views on Trade and Globali-
zation, CATO INST. FREE TRADE BULL., Nov. 2, 2018, at 1, 1.  
 42. Id. at 9.  
 43. See Michael D. Cobb & Mark T. Nance, The Consequences of Measuring Non-Attitudes about For-
eign Trade Preferences, SURV. PRACTICE, Nov. 30, 2011, at 1, 1 (“As we demonstrate, the failure to screen for 
non-attitudes greatly exaggerates the percentage of people who have meaningful preferences about trade. In 
addition, we show how varying core measurement strategies can easily turn pluralities into majorities with dif-
ferent preference distributions . . . .”).  
 44. Id. at 2; see also Alan S. Blinder, The Free-Trade Paradox: The Bad Politics of a Good Idea, 
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2019, at 119, 121 (“Trump was able to push so many Americans into sixteenth-
century thinking because most Americans’ belief in free trade is a mile wide but an inch deep. Polls show that 
the level of support depends on what is meant by “free trade,” how the question is posed, and when it is 
asked.”).  
 45. DANI RODRIK & RAFAEL DI TELLA, LABOR MARKET SHOCKS AND THE DEMAND FOR TRADE 
PROTECTION: EVIDENCE FROM ONLINE SURVEYS (2019), http://j.mp/2FrXwYC. Indeed, Rodrik and Di Tella 
find that voter demand for protectionism rises most significantly not only in response to trade shocks, but in 
particular when the shock arises from outsourcing to a developing country (as opposed to a developed country).  
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Apart from intensity, voter preferences are also funneled through election 
procedures that accord different weight to different voters’ views. For instance, 
given the importance of seniority in Congress, a vote cast for a new member of 
Congress is worth less than a vote cast for a member of Congressional leader-
ship or a committee chair. Political geography can thus accord certain policy 
views outsized importance. If a leader is beholden to voters who hold a particu-
lar view, that view may prevail even though it does not represent the majority 
position nationally. Reopening the government during the recent shutdown, for 
instance, enjoyed clear majority support in the United States, yet the Republi-
can leadership in the Senate refused for weeks to allow a vote on the issue due 
to its importance to Republican primary voters.46  
Where trade policy is concerned, the most important actor, as a practical 
matter, is the president.47 Despite misleading coverage of nation-wide election 
polls every four years, U.S. presidents are elected through a series of state elec-
tions in which almost every state awards its electoral votes on a winner-takes-
all basis. Moreover, most states vote reliably for whichever candidate is nomi-
nated by a particular party. As a consequence, presidential elections are decided 
in a small handful of swing states. Because those states decide the outcome of 
the election, their voters’ views are likely to have outsized influence over pres-
idential policy. Policy preferences about trade in states that vote reliably for 
one party or the other are considerably less influential. Everyone in New York 
and California could staunchly support trade liberalization, but since those 
states are reliable Democratic states, those views would be unlikely to impress 
President Trump.  
In our current political geography, those swing states are disproportion-
ately states—for instance, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin—that 
have lost manufacturing jobs that were central to the economic and social iden-
tity of many communities.48 While political realignments can, of course, 
scramble this political geography, these states have been important battle-
grounds in recent elections and seemed poised to be in upcoming elections as 
well. As a consequence, we should expect negative feelings about trade liberal-
 
 46. Despite polls showing that 71% of Americans support Congress passing a bill to reopen the govern-
ment, the Senate will not allow such a vote because of the importance of the border wall to their political base. 
See Kimberley Gross & John Sides, No Wonder There’s a Shutdown: New Poll Shows How Much Republicans 
and Democrats Really Disagree on Immigration, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/15/no-wonder-theres-a-shutdown-new-poll-
shows-republicans-and-democrats-disagree-profoundly-on-immigration/?utm_term=.f54677e24201. Gun con-
trol legislation is perhaps the best-known example of a policy in which the majority view appears to have little 
effect on policy. See Michelle Cottle, Baby Steps for Gun Reform, ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/gun-reform-congress/554603/. 
 47. As a matter of constitutional law, the most important actor is Congress. See Meyer & Sitaraman, 
supra note 8, at 39.  
 48. See Nicolas Lamp, How Should We Think About the Winners and Losers from Globalization? Three 
Narratives and Their Implications for the Redesign of International Economic Agreements (Nov. 26, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3290590 (describing the at-
tachment communities feel to certain jobs as akin to an attachment to property).  
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ization, which are more prevalent in these states, to continue to receive outsized 
attention from successful presidential candidates.  
III. SUPERVISED UNILATERALISM 
The durability of the crisis tells us that we need policy solutions. In this 
Part, I focus on one solution that Professor Shaffer proposes: revising trade 
remedies laws to permit countries to impose social dumping duties. As I ex-
plain below, this idea has great promise, but some peril as well.  
The Peril 
First, the peril. In short, expanding trade remedies to permit social dump-
ing duties raises the risk of expanding unilateralism. The WTO’s Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding prohibits nations from taking retaliatory action until the 
Dispute Settlement Body has adjudicated the dispute and granted authorization 
to retaliate.49 Trade remedies—antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and 
safeguards—are exceptions to this rule.50  A proposal to expand trade remedies 
to combat social dumping thus necessarily involves expanding the role of uni-
lateralism in the trading system.  
In principle, of course, this expansion of trade remedies would be accom-
panied by new international rules governing the permissible use of social 
dumping duties.51 Such rules could, again in theory, limit the risk of unilateral-
ism by subjecting unilateral trade remedies to ex post review by the WTO. In 
this way, a social dumping regime offers the possibility of reconciling a greater 
role for states to unilaterally pursue their vision of a socially inclusive trade 
policy within the larger multilateral trading system.  
To see the risks posed by a social dumping regime, consider why the 
states that would be the initial targets of social dumping duties (e.g., China and 
India) would agree to new rules permitting the unilateral imposition of duties 
on their products by countries like the United States and Europe. Professor 
Shaffer’s answer is to swap an agreement on social dumping duties for new 
rules permitting the legitimate use of industrial policy.52 By agreeing to a social 
dumping regime, developing countries would gain greater freedom to subsidize 
infant industries and provide other forms of economic development support.  
As Professor Shaffer recognizes, the problem with this proposed swap is 
that developing countries do not currently feel excessively constrained by WTO 
rules, most notably the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
 
 49. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. XXIII, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
 50. GATT arts. VI & XIX. 
 51. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 34.   
 52. Id. at 33–41.  
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Measures.53 China, in particular, seems perfectly happy with the current WTO 
rules on industrial policy as practiced, which have not really prevented it from 
engaging in massive government intervention in the market. Smaller develop-
ing countries, for their part, may lack the capability to engage in large-scale in-
dustrial policy. Even if they have the capacity, the effects from industrial policy 
in smaller developing countries may not justify bringing cases against those 
countries, leaving them free to do as they please. On its own terms, then, the 
swap would appear to offer little for developing countries, while promising the 
imposition of even greater costs. 
As current events and Professor Shaffer’s article both attest, developed 
countries, not developing countries, are the ones clamoring for policy space in 
today’s trading system. Developed countries like the United States are also 
relatively more constrained than countries like China in how they pursue their 
development objectives. China can feel free to make use of its extensive influ-
ence over its banking sector to provide development assistance, for instance.54 
If the United States wishes to provide similar subsidies, they must be approved 
by a U.S. Congress that is slow to pass legislation of any kind, let alone signifi-
cant social programs that might easily become political liabilities.55 Conse-
quently, the United States is more likely to provide financial support through 
means other than direct subsidies, such as tariffs on imported goods or local 
content requirements. Such means of support are less transparent and often eas-
ier to build political coalitions around, and therefore relatively easier to provide 
in democratic systems sensitive to the perceptions of rent-seeking.56 Unfortu-
nately, these means of support run afoul of WTO rules in ways that are clearer 
and easier to demonstrate than many of China’s means of support. In this way, 
WTO rules actually constrain industrial policy in developed countries more 
than developing countries. 
Professor Shaffer also proposes modeling the predicate for social dump-
ing duties on existing labor and environmental chapters (which themselves 
draw on existing multilateral labor and environmental rules).57 I fully support 
this proposal, but I am again uncertain why developing countries would agree 
 
 53. Id. at 42 (“Similarly, to the extent that many developing countries do not feel that constrained by the 
SCM Agreement in practice, they may find that they have less to gain from these negotiations than developed 
countries.”).  
 54. Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 261, 303 
(2016).  
 55. See, e.g., Stephen Dinan, Obama Clean Energy Loans Leave Taxpayers in $2.2 Billion Hole, WASH. 
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/27/obama-backed-green-energy-
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loans given to Solyndra could result in political repercussions). 
 56. Arthur Dunkel & Frieder Roessler, The Ranking of Trade Policy Instruments Under the GATT Legal 
System, in PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 39, at 224; Timothy Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote 
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 57. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 38.   
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to import these norms into the WTO. Although both the United States and the 
European Union have labor and environmental provisions in their FTAs, nei-
ther has an FTA with China or India, meaning that they have not agreed that 
those norms should be attached to enforceable trade rules. As a consequence, 
countries like China and India might well feel that a negotiation about the pred-
icate for social dumping duties need not be limited to those issues important to 
developed countries. Instead, just as GATT article XX’s exception for public 
morals incorporates a degree of relativity,58 these countries might push for rules 
permitting the imposition of social dumping duties in response to concerns of 
their own. China might, for instance, conceive of social dumping duties as a 
means of censoring certain kinds of imported material deemed socially immoral 
or politically dangerous.  
Beyond the difficulties in negotiating multilateral rules governing the use 
of social dumping duties, the way in which such duties are used poses its own 
risks of unilateralism. Most obviously, if negotiations broke down and devel-
oped countries adopted social dumping measures without first having come to a 
multilateral agreement, the adoption of expansive measures of a similar kind by 
developing countries seems assured. After all, other countries have imposed 
their own trade barriers in response to the Trump administration’s unilateral 
imposition of tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
and, in China’s case, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.59 There is every 
reason to think the same would occur if countries proceeded with a social 
dumping regime unilaterally.  
Even with multilateral oversight, however, abuse of the new rules could 
still lead to spiraling unilateralism. Professor Shaffer again recognizes the need 
for new rules to limit abuse, proposing, for instance, the possibility of damages 
for a successful claimant.60 But I fear the possibility of abuse is considerably 
greater. For instance, countries notoriously underchallenge trade remedies im-
posed on their products.61 Instead, countries tend to employ “vigilante justice,” 
imposing retaliatory trade remedies and bypassing the WTO system entirely.62 
Moreover, the aggressive use of trade remedies is common to both developed 
and developing countries. Although countries regularly complain about U.S. 
and E.U. trade remedy measures,63 China and India are among the most active 
 
 58. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Services, ¶ 326, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005); Appellate Body Re-
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users of trade remedies.64 Expanding trade remedies to include social dumping 
duties may therefore lead to an expansion in the tit-for-tat use of trade reme-
dies. One might not view such a result as problematic. Tit-for-tat trade disputes 
have, after all, always been a part of the multilateral trading system. But the 
ramifications of increasing the role for such disputes are certainly worth con-
sidering. 
The Promise 
Ultimately, the promise of a social dumping regime makes these risks 
worth it.65 For all of the reasons Professor Shaffer identifies, the trading system 
needs to find better ways to allow governments to promote social inclusion and 
economic justice. Professor Shaffer has offered a detailed way to build such a 
system, and he has thoughtfully conceived of the system as an extension of ex-
isting rules, a move designed to make a social dumping regime less of a diplo-
matic lift than it might otherwise be (although, to be sure, it remains a signifi-
cant one).  
Indeed, the peril of social dumping—increased unilateralism—is also one 
of its great assets. The WTO has many virtues, but its ability to respond to is-
sues of social inclusion has not been one of them. Firmly situated within the 
first step of Professor Shaffer’s two-step model, WTO institutions have been 
relatively unresponsive to issues of economic distribution or environmental jus-
tice.66 Policy space for greater unilateralism in pursuit of those values can in-
troduce into the trading regime what the process of multilateral negotiations has 
so far failed to. The perfect also should not be the enemy of the good. Proposals 
to address social inclusion within the trading system are not elegant mathemati-
cal proofs; they are legal and diplomatic solutions the implementation of which 
will require substantial effort and compromise.  
The perils identified above, however, do point to what I think might be a 
more productive negotiating strategy to achieve a social dumping regime: trad-
ing a reinvigorated and substantially revised dispute settlement system for a so-
cial dumping regime. The United States has refused to permit the election of 
new members of the WTO’s Appellate Body, and has invoked GATT article 
XXI’s national security exception, it hopes, to make its national security tariffs 
 
 64. See Willemien Viljoen, Trade Remedies and Safeguards in BRICS Countries 1–2 (Trade Law Cen-
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 66. Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Selective Enforcement, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 491, 556–
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on steel and aluminum unreviewable.67 The United States’ position on the Ap-
pellate Body has to a large extent been influenced by adverse rulings on trade 
remedies measures, rulings it views as judicial activism.68  
In the face of these actions, China in particular has positioned itself as a 
defender of the multilateral system.69 And no wonder—the WTO’s dispute set-
tlement system offers China the best protection available to it against the Unit-
ed States’ unilateral action. However fast China’s economy has grown in recent 
years, the United States remains the world’s largest economy. Moreover, im-
portant Chinese companies like tech giant Huawei remain dependent on U.S. 
technology, creating additional points of leverage for the United States. Other 
developing countries, although of less concern to the United States at this time, 
enjoy similar benefits from the WTO’s dispute settlement system.70 Put simply, 
these countries fare better against powerful countries in a world with a func-
tioning multilateral dispute system than in a world without one.  
Developing countries thus have a major interest in seeing the WTO dis-
pute system functional again. They also have an interest in seeing developed 
countries adopt social inclusion policies that tamp down on anti-trade politics.71 
Indeed, as Professors Shaffer and Nicolas Lamp note, developing countries 
pushed for the inclusion of provisions on developed countries adjustment poli-
cies in the original GATT in the hopes that such provisions would reduce the 
domestic pressure on developed countries to maintain or erect trade barriers.72 
The current turmoil in the trading system, created most prominently by the 
United States and the possibility of Brexit, underscores the wisdom of this posi-
tion. Developing countries have an interest in giving developed countries more 
tools to address issues of social inclusion.  
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Developing countries thus might be persuaded to agree to a social dump-
ing regime if they thought that doing so would buy them stability and judicial 
oversight within the multilateral system. Such a deal would involve substantial 
changes to the way WTO dispute settlement functions. Proposals for such 
changes have been widely discussed elsewhere and a detailed discussion of 
them is beyond the scope of this short essay.73 But Professor Shaffer’s sugges-
tion that countries be able to obtain damages for wrongful trade remedies 
measures is a good one. A separate dispute settlement system for trade reme-
dies disputes is another good proposal.74  
Along with a social dumping regime, these proposals would increase both 
the unilateral power of states to respond to issues of social inclusion and 
strengthen the multilateral system’s ability to oversee the unilateral exercise of 
power. In this way, pairing a social dumping regime with a revised and repaired 
dispute settlement system would shift the WTO toward a system that favors ex 
post review, instead of ex ante review, of what would look very much like re-
taliatory measures. As Professor Shaffer suggests, such a move would need to 
be paired with stronger remedies for successful challengers, such as compensa-
tory damages. But the combination of these measures could appeal to devel-
oped and developing countries alike. 
Perhaps most importantly, in trade remedies cases, the party on whom 
trade remedies have been imposed is the challenger and thus bears the burden 
of demonstrating that the imposition of trade remedies is unlawful.75 As a re-
sult, permitting social dumping duties would create a presumption that state ac-
tion in support of policies of social inclusion is lawful. At this moment in time, 
such a presumption might have a salutary effect for the trading system well be-
yond its significance in legal disputes.  
CONCLUSION 
The distributional effects of trade liberalization threaten to tear apart the 
multilateral trading system, and the threat is not leaving us anytime soon. The 
twenty-first century challenge for those wishing to preserve the trading system 
is to safeguard the great good that comes from an open trading system while 
preserving room for governments to respond to issues of social inclusion. Pro-
fessor Shaffer has diagnosed the problem and set out a path to a solution. Alt-
hough amending international trade law to allow social dumping is likely to 
face resistance from developing countries and could ultimately lead to an in-
crease in unilateral retaliation, its potential benefits—allowing nations to re-
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spond quickly to issues of social inclusion and strengthening the multilateral 
system—make it an idea worth pursuing. 
 
